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Conclusion

What the Past Suggests

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In 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon with the express aim of destroying the Shi'a militia, Hezbollah, and ending its annoying habit of firing rockets into northern Israel and conducting raids on Israeli garrisons along the Lebanese border. The Israeli military venture was a failure. Despite overwhelming conventional military power, complete air superiority, precision-guided munitions, and considerable conceptualization about how technology might change war in the present and future, the Israelis ran into an opponent who surprised them on a number of levels.

Ironically, to a considerable extent, the IDF's difficulties resulted from its considerable buy-in to the technophilia that had marked the American enthusiasm in the 1990s and early 2000s for what many termed "the revolution in military affairs." The stunning success of the coalition in the Gulf War of January to February 1991 suggested to some Pentagon analysts that the U.S. military had created capabilities that would revolutionize war, at least for those who held the technological high ground. The advocates of the revolution in military affairs argued that technological advances in precision weapons, surveillance capabilities, computers, information systems, and sensors would allow the American military in future wars to see, grasp, and destroy enemy forces before they could effectively respond.[1] Despite the best efforts of the Office of the Secretary

[1] For an examination of the actual role of military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs throughout history, see the first and last chapters of MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolutions, 1300–2050* (Cambridge, 2000).

of Defense's Office of Net Assessment to underline that such revolutions in the past were largely conceptual rather than technological, the pursuit of a technological nirvana came to dominate the thinking of much of the American military.

In part influenced by American thinking, the IDF rolled into Lebanon with the expectation that its technological and conventional military superiority would allow it to destroy its opponents in short order. That was not the case. At the tactical level, Hezbollah fought a war that mixed conventional military action with guerrilla and terrorist strikes, all the while firing a large number of missiles at northern Galilee. Deeply entrenched in foxholes, bunkers, and fortified positions and utilizing ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, Hezbollah's infantry inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. Although in no sense did the Shi'a militia come close to defeating the Israelis, their performance was good enough to enable Hezbollah to claim at least a stalemate, which was as good as a victory to an Arab world long used to defeat at the hands of the IDF. Moreover, if the Israelis did not suffer an outright military defeat, they certainly suffered a political defeat of considerable proportions.

Hezbollah's performance also caught the attention of defense experts and pundits in Washington, a city inhabited by a large body of defense cognoscenti who regard history as a tiresome exercise, certainly not one for the "real experts" in defense matters. To many of these analysts, the combination by Shi'a militia of conventional military tactics with guerrilla and terrorist activities appeared to represent a novel approach to war that would revolutionize conflict in the twenty-first century. Conferences and articles on this supposedly new form of conflict sprouted like mushrooms in the basements of dismal castles. Few, if any, of these exercises in thinking about the future examined history to see if the past might offer context and evidence to understand this phenomena of political entities mixing conventional military operations with the activities of insurgents and terrorists. Given what passes for serious intellectual discourse in Washington, this response to the challenge of hybrid war is not surprising.

Despite the surprise that the events in Lebanon elicited in the American defense community, the historical record suggests that hybrid warfare in one form or another may well be the norm for human conflict rather than the exception. Moreover, history also suggests that such conflicts may well be the most difficult conflicts to win. If that is so, then that wonderful comment by the great American philosopher Yogi Berra – it's "déjá vu all over again" – reverberates as a warning that much of the

present only represents an echo of the past. But then, Thucydides had already noted in that greatest of all historical examinations of war that he had written his work because "it will be enough for me . . . if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."[2]

Ironically, during the 2003 destruction of Saddam Hussein's murderous regime by U.S. and coalition military forces, for a short period that conflict resembled in many of its manifestations hybrid warfare at its most ferocious. Despite warnings from a number of his advisors during the run-up to the invasion, Saddam refused to recognize the nature of the looming American threat: large-scale conventional operations.[3] Instead, given Saddam's perception that it was doubtful the Americans would dare to invade his country, Iraq's substantial paramilitary and conventional forces focused on internal security in the belief that the more likely danger would be, as in March 1991, an internal uprising by the Shi'a. When the invasion came, Saddam, contemptuous of American technology and fighting ability, committed both his conventional and irregular forces to a stand-up fight. The result was that substantial portions of Saddam's paramilitary Ba'ath forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, made the mistake of attacking the 3rd Infantry Division in the desert as it moved north along the Euphrates River. There, caught in the open, the Abrams and Bradleys of the American military slaughtered them.

Nevertheless, the ferocity of the paramilitary attacks caught the attention of the Americans, especially the V Corps commander, Lieutenant General William "Scott" Wallace. In an interview with reporters from the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* on 27 March, Wallace commented that "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of the paramilitary forces. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight."[4] That remark,

[2] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (London, 1954), p. 48.

[3] For an examination based on the massive haul of Iraqi documents captured by coalition forces in April and May 2003, see Kevin M. Woods with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, *The Iraqi Perspectives Report, Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report* (Annapolis, MD, 2006).

[4] Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II, The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York, 2006), p. 311.

which almost got Wallace fired by two of the most arrogant and incompetent senior officials in American military history, was spot on.[5]

In fact, luckily for the Americans, Saddam had refused the advice of his most competent general. Lieutenant General Raad Hamdani had urged the dictator to hide his conventional military units in Iraq's cities, where in combination with the Fedayeen they could execute what in retrospect would have looked quite similar to the military operations Hezbollah was to carry out in Lebanon in 2006.[6] But Saddam dismissed the American military and its lethal technological capabilities. Thus, the Iraqi Army stood and fought along the Euphrates, where a combination of U.S. air and ground power destroyed it in short order. Had the Iraqis followed a strategy of burrowing their conventional military forces in the cities and then used the fanatical Fedayeen to attack the Americans within that urban terrain, the invaders of Iraq, especially considering the presence of Al Jazeera and Western journalists, would have faced the problem of digging the Iraqi fighters out amidst millions of civilians, a picture that would not have played well on the world's media stage. As it was, the last battles within Baghdad against a broken and almost leaderless combination of weak conventional forces and Fedayeen turned into a nasty enough experience for the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division.[7]

THE LOGIC OF NUMBERS AND COMMITMENT

In one of his more ironic comments, Clausewitz notes that "no one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."[8] Of course, the irony lies in the fact that although most statesmen and military leaders have some conception of what they hope to accomplish in embarking on war, in fact, the connection between the ends and the means they plan to employ is often tenuous at best.[9]

[5] The two individuals are obviously the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and the U.S. CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks.

[6] See Woods et al., *The Iraqi Perspectives Report*, pp. 25–32.

[7] In this respect, see Jim Lacey, *Take Down, The 3rd Infantry Division's Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad* (Annapolis, MD, 2007), pp. 208–247.

[8] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1975), p. 579.

[9] In fact, in some cases, political leaders have had no clear idea of what they hope their war will achieve. The author of this chapter has been involved in a project using Iraqi documents and transcripts of meetings to examine the planning and conduct of the war

Making the historical picture even more depressing is the fact that rarely do those who embark on war possess a realistic understanding of the "other." In the centuries before the birth of Christ, the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu commented that one should "know [your] enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" – the most basic principle of war and strategy but one to which few political and military leaders have paid attention.[10]

The problem with not understanding the other, his culture, what he values, and his approach to war is that the enemy will in all such cases fight within a framework that fits his rather than our understanding of war. To fail to understand not only the strategic framework but also the tactical and operational framework within which an enemy will fight is a guaranteed recipe for disaster. Such understanding is basic to any strategy, whether at the grand or theater level. Again, we confront one of Clausewitz's most basic paradoxes: "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult."[11] Yet, the catalogue of military failures that litter the historical landscape would make it appear that achieving such understanding is nearly impossible for humans.

The basic issue in hybrid warfare has been the consistent ability of those defending their state or political entity to pose a twofold threat to their opponents. By possessing conventional forces that can at the right time and place concentrate sufficient military power to destroy portions of the attacking forces, a defending force presents the attacker with the need to keep his forces concentrated. Yet, the possession of other forces that control the countryside by ambushing messengers, disrupting supply convoys, and attacking isolated units presents the attacker with a quandary: Deal with the enemy's irregular forces by dispersing one's own forces, which in turn makes the dispersed units vulnerable to the enemy's conventional forces, or keep one's forces concentrated and cede control of the countryside to the enemy. Moreover, the employment of large conventional forces, no matter how successful they might be against the dispersed forces of the enemy, may exacerbate the natural hostility of the population against the interlopers, who have disturbed their well-being. And that in turn can only serve to increase the support for unconventional,

against Iran that Saddam waged from 1980 to 1988. What is clear in the documents from 1980 is that Saddam and his advisors had no clear idea of what he believed military operations could achieve against the Iranians.

[10] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963), p. 84.

[11] Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 119.

guerrilla forces. The quandary is obvious; yet, those military organizations that have confronted opponents who have relied on hybrid warfare to defend themselves have had a spotty record.

THOUGHTS ON HISTORY AND HYBRID WARS

It would seem on the basis of the chapters in this study that success in such cases has rested on several crucial factors. The first and perhaps the most important lesson is that overwhelming superiority in resources and manpower can be but is not always decisive in such conflicts. Equally important is the will power to expend those resources over substantial periods of time because the historical cases suggest that there are no "silver bullet" solutions in these conflicts. In other words, *blitzkrieg* is not in the vocabulary of hybrid war.

The Roman Empire clearly possessed the resources and the ruthlessness to win a hybrid war against the German tribes. Yet, given the lack of an agricultural base in Germany – and there would not be one until the invention of the moldboard plow in the seventh century AD – did it make sense strategically to fight and win such a hugely expensive war, when it would be exceedingly difficult to sustain Rome's legions logistically on the Elbe? Considering the enormous success of Roman arms and diplomacy following the disaster suffered by Varus and his legions, it would seem that the Romans made the decision not to fight a war to conquer Germania and its fractious tribes on the basis of sound strategic decision making.[12]

Thus, the aims of the great Roman invasions of Drusus and Tiberius that came in the aftermath of the Teutoburg Wald disaster aimed at breaking the German threat to Roman territory, specifically Gaul, rather than at re-creating the province that had slipped away in the darkness of the German forests. The will was no longer there to support such an effort, although most probably for reasons other than Roman unwillingness to bear the costs of such a war. Instead, having tramped through the gloomy forests of Germany, they saw no strategic or political reasons to conquer such worthless lands, at least for the present. A century and a half later, Marcus Aurelius may have aimed at expanding the Empire to the borders of the upper Oder, but our sources simply are not sufficiently clear to

[12] Since Edward Luttwak's *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD, 1976), the question of Roman grand strategy has attracted considerable interest from ancient historians, many of whom today have come to the bizarre conclusion that because the Romans did not have a term for grand strategy, they could not have had one.

understand what exactly the aims of his wars in the 170s might have been.

Equally important, those who desire to wage hybrid war must possess the means, either from their own sources or from foreign aid, to maintain a creditable conventional capability, one sufficient to prevent their opponents from being able to concentrate on controlling the countryside and the population. The Irish rebels against Elizabethan English rule failed to cross the boundary from partisan-insurgent warfare to conventional war for a sufficient length of time to wage a truly effective hybrid war. Nor were their Spanish allies able to provide sufficient arms and conventional troops to make up for what the Irish lacked, a conventional military capability that would enable the insurgents to win in a conventional, European-style battle. The Irish have always been extraordinarily brave warriors, but they lacked the resources and knowledge to put an effective conventional army in the field. In contrast, the Spanish could never quite see the advantages to their strategic position of supporting the Irish with sufficient conventional forces to provide a real chance for victory over the English. In the end, the determination of history's course is always a matter of the context within which events occur, and from the Spanish perspective, what really mattered was the suppression of the revolt in the Netherlands, not what happened in the cold, wet bogs of Ireland.

The problems presented by hybrid war in the American Revolution and in the American Civil War present a number of interesting contrasts in addition to quite marked similarities. In both cases, the power confronting hybrid warfare should have possessed a deep understanding of its opponent. Yet, as far as British understanding of their colonial opponents went, they might as well have been conducting a campaign on the moon for all the understanding they displayed. That ignorance, of course, stood in the face of the fact that British armed forces had engaged in major campaigns in North America during Queen Anne's War, the War of Austrian Succession, and what the colonists termed the French and Indian War.

Moreover, British military forces spoke the same language as their opponents, derived their attitudes and beliefs from a common culture with the colonists, and had deployed substantial military forces in the colonies over the past three decades. One can, of course, understand the ignorance displayed by the policy makers in London, few of whom had spent a day on the other side of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, that does not explain the apparent ignorance of those who had spent time in the colonies. Thus, the almost complete obliviousness to both the nature of

the terrain over which British would wage their campaigns as well as of the colonists they would fight led to a variety of avoidable military defeats. The expedition to Lexington and Concord came close to disaster. Bunker Hill represented the most egregious sort of underestimation of the colonial opponent, which led to a Pyrrhic victory. Only the steadfastness of the British soldiers redeemed the inexcusable stupidity of their generals.

Still, the revolution came close to collapse in the attempt of the colonial militia to stand out in the open and take on British regulars in the battles around New York in late summer and fall 1776. But the British efforts to hold the Jersies with a cordon strategy foundered on the small conventional forces that Washington put in the field in the harsh weather of December 1776 to January 1777. The defeats that his small conventional force administered to the British at Trenton and Princeton were sufficient to keep the flame of rebellion alive. The Americans quickly won back the Jersies, the population of which the conduct of British and Hessian troops had already done much to drive back into the revolutionary camp. But the worst of the British defeats came at Saratoga, where clouds of colonial militia morphed into an effective representation of a conventional military force – at least when operating in the terrain of the semi-wilderness lying to the north of Albany. That defeat extinguished the notion that the British could crush the colonial rebellion even before the French entered the war and confronted the British with the possibility that they might lose not only the colonies but the rest of their empire as well.

The intriguing question, then, is whether the British might have been able to defeat the colonists by another strategic approach, even given their underestimation of their opponent. Some historians and analysts have suggested that had Howe supported Burgoyne's move from Canada by driving up the Hudson to meet at Albany, the British could have sundered New England from the remainder of the rebellious colonies. They would then have been in a position to win the war. However, as Alexander Hamilton commented (see the aforementioned essay on hybrid warfare and the American Revolution), to be effective such a strategy would have depended on a considerably larger army than the British possessed, not only to garrison a number of points along the Hudson River and to patrol between them but to forage as well into Connecticut and Massachusetts.

Such expeditions would have required raiding parties far larger than that launched by Gage against Lexington and Concord or Burgoyne against Bennington, both of which met with disaster. Similarly, the garrisons scattered along the Hudson would have had to be larger than those

that Washington picked off along the Delaware at the end of 1776. Thus, to accomplish such a strategy of dividing the colonies, the British would have required a much larger army and enough time to wear the colonists down. Neither resource was available to the British in 1777, especially because the French were awaiting the first favorable moment to enter the conflict. In the end, Howe probably recognized this reality. Thus, he moved against Philadelphia in the hopes of gaining a decisive victory over the colonists by destroying Washington's army and capturing the newly proclaimed colonial capital. Howe's army did capture Philadelphia and gave the revolutionary army a proper pounding at Brandywine, but he failed in the larger strategic aim of causing the collapse of the revolution.

That brings us to the American Civil War, the best example of a conflict in which those conducting hybrid warfare went down to catastrophic defeat. It is therefore worth examining in considerable detail, both for how the North won the war and the unintended costs that victory brought in its wake. As with the British in the Revolutionary War, the North substantially underestimated the commitment and staying power of the Confederacy. But it did possess the resources and the will to fight and destroy an opponent who had recourse to hybrid warfare.

Northern military forces managed to split the Confederacy into two parts with the capture of Vicksburg and Grand Gulf in the summer of 1863. The second great drive in the west from northwestern Tennessee through the center of the state to Chattanooga in 1863 had as decisive an impact on the course of the war as the Mississippi campaign. In both cases, Union forces ran into hybrid warfare in its most virulent form. Large raiding parties of Confederate cavalry, insurgents, and guerrillas all gave the Bluecoats fits. All of these irregular forces presented a constant threat, often realized, to cut Union supply lines that were constantly lengthening as Union forces drove ever deeper into the Confederate heartland. At the same time, Union armies faced major Confederate conventional armies: Grant's Army of the Tennessee confronted Pemberton's army, while Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland faced the Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg.

In December 1862, Grant began an ambitious offensive against Vicksburg from his forward logistics base at Holly Springs in northern Mississippi. However, a cavalry raid led by Major General Earl Van Dorn maneuvered behind Grant's army and entirely destroyed the laboriously stockpiled caches of ammunition and food stored there. Forced to withdraw because of his logistical shortfalls, Grant discovered that he was able to feed his army from what the local farms and plantations

along his path of retreat produced. When the locals complained about Union foraging, Grant had a forthright reply: "We had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that, men with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty."[13]

That was a lesson that Grant did not forget. In his fast-moving campaign against Vicksburg in spring 1863, the Army of the Tennessee crossed the Mississippi south of Vicksburg, cut its supply lines to the north, swung northeast to smash Mississippi's capital, and then swung back west to shut up Pemberton's army in Vicksburg. Moreover, Grant moved so fast that the Confederates were unable to concentrate against him or his foraging parties, while Grant's troops possessed sufficient local superiority to ensure that his foragers could strip the countryside clean. With no lines of supply to attack, guerrilla activities were irrelevant. Once Grant closed in on Vicksburg, his army was able to reestablish secure supply lines to the north up the Mississippi River.

The situation in Tennessee, however, was much less amenable to solution. There, a full-scale version of hybrid warfare occurred throughout 1862 and 1863. In fact, so bad was the situation at the end of 1862 that Rosecrans had to deploy almost as many troops to guard his supply lines on the railroads in north and central Tennessee leading to Nashville and along the Tennessee River as he was able to employ in his advance to Stone's River against Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee. The situation hardly improved over the course of the remainder of 1863, with raiders such as Nathan Bedford Forrest and local guerrillas making the support of Union armies in the drive to Chattanooga both expensive and difficult.

After Grant wrecked Bragg's Army of Tennessee in November 1863, he and Sherman confronted the problem of how to secure their lines of communication for the campaign that would begin in spring 1864 to take and hold Atlanta. Widespread depredations of Confederate cavalry raids, partisans, and guerrillas would make life difficult for any sustained advance into Georgia. At the same time, Union forces would face Joe Johnston's Army of Tennessee in what promised to be a major struggle between major conventional armies.[14]

[13] Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, ed. E. B. Long (New York, 1982), p. 227.

[14] Grant would not assume overall command of Union forces until March 1864. Up to that point, he was the overall commander of the Division of the Mississippi, which encompassed all Union forces between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains.

Grant, in command in the west until promoted to command all Union armies in March 1864, and Sherman hit on a two-pronged approach to solve their dilemma. The first of these prongs involved a massive program of bolstering the railroad infrastructure that ran across Tennessee to Chattanooga and that was vulnerable to Confederate raiders, guerrillas, and partisans. These railroads, along with the railroad Union troops would reconstruct to supply the movement forward from Chattanooga to Atlanta, would prove the essential component in Sherman's eventual success. The effort to ensure the uninterrupted flow of supplies involved (1) the rebuilding and strengthening of the road beds of the Tennessee railroads; (2) the construction of block houses and defensive positions to protect key bridges from partisans and raiders; (3) the establishment of a large number of caches of ties, rails, telegraph wiring, and other construction materials to enable the rapid repair of any damage the Confederate irregulars managed to achieve; (4) the purchase of an excess number of locomotives and railroad cars to replace those damaged or destroyed as needed; and (5) the establishment of repair teams throughout the system to move rapidly to repair breaks in the line.[15]

Despite Confederate attacks, the logistical system functioned successfully throughout the campaign. As Sherman noted in his memoirs, "The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads from Louisville to Nashville – one hundred and eighty-five miles – from Nashville to Chattanooga – one hundred and fifty-one miles – and from Chattanooga to Atlanta – one hundred and thirty-seven miles."[16]

The second prong was an approach to the war that aimed at breaking the will of the South's civilian population.[17] Grant had seen this coming as early as the aftermath of Shiloh, but Sherman placed the conduct of the war by the Union best in a series of letters to various civilian authorities in northern Alabama and Georgia who complained about the depredations of his troops at the beginning of 1864:

> The government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all rights which they chose to enforce in war, to take their lives, their houses,

[15] For this effort, see Thomas Weber, *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861–1861* (Bloomington, IN, 1952), pp. 199–208.

[16] William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (New York, 1990), p. 889.

[17] For an outstanding discussion about what might best be termed the "hard war," see Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War, Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865* (Cambridge, 1995).

> their land, their everything, because they cannot deny that war exists there, and war is simply power unconstrained by constitution or compact. If they want eternal warfare, well and good. We will accept the issue and [dispossess] them and put our friends in possession. To those who submit, to the rightful law and authority all gentleness and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent secessionist, why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better. Satan and the rebellious saint[s] of heaven were allowed a continuance of existence in hell merely to swell their just punishment.[18]

That attitude was certainly evident in Sherman's march through Georgia, and to an even greater extent when his troops reached South Carolina, which they regarded quite correctly as the heartland of the secessionist movement. A Union officer, born in Alabama and serving with Sherman's army, noted the following about the march:

> I am bound to say, while I deplore this necessity daily [of laying waste to the countryside of Georgia] and cannot bear to see the soldiers swarm. Through fields and yards, – I do believe it is a necessity. Nothing *can* end this war but some demonstration of their helplessness, and the miserable ability of J.D. [Jefferson Davis] to protect them . . . But war is war, and a horrible necessity at best; yet when forced on us as this war is, there is no help but to make it so terrible that when peace comes it will last.[19]

Indeed, the "Chimneyvilles" created by Sherman's troops in their march through Georgia and especially South Carolina resembled Bomber Command's "dehousing" of the German population in the Second World War, except in this case the Union soldiers allowed the Confederates to exit their houses and barns before destroying them.

While Sherman was wrecking the Deep South, Grant made explicit his intentions of destroying the Shenandoah, that nest of irregulars as well as a well-used Confederate route to invade the North. In a note to Union chief of staff Henry Halleck, Grant made clear that he wanted Union armies to "eat out [the Shenandoah] clean and clear as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their own provender with them."[20] By April 1865, Union troops had wrecked not only Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina but also James

[18] Quoted in Walter Lynwood Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (Montgomery, AL, 1905), p. 76.

[19] Mark A. Dewolfe Howe, ed., *Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock* (New Haven, CT, 1927), pp. 82, 93.

[20] Shelby Foote, *The Civil War, A Narrative History*, vol. 3, *Red River to Appomattox* (New York, 1974), p. 540.

Wilson's massive cavalry raid that month swamped Nathan Forrest's raiders and destroyed what was left of central and southern Alabama.

As to that bizarre suggestion that a number of armchair Civil War historians have suggested – namely, that Southerners were not fully committed to the cause because they did not continue guerrilla warfare after the defeat of their regular military forces – one might note the comment of a Southern woman in the aftermath of the Confederate catastrophe:

> We never yielded in the struggle until we were bound hand & foot & the heel of the despot was on our throats. Bankrupt in men, in money, & in provisions, the wail of the bereaved & the cry of hunger rising over the land, our cities burned with fire and our pleasant things laid waste, the best & bravest of our sons in captivity, and the entire resources of our country exhausted – what else could we do but give up.[21]

There was, moreover, a warning embedded in Sherman's note to Southerners quoted earlier: If they refused to quit the war, then the North would carry out the extreme measures of dispossessing them of their land and their lives. The war never reached that level, undoubtedly because most Confederates, having seen the extent to which Union destructiveness had reached by 1865, were not willing to engage at a continued throw of the iron dice for an uncertain future.

Union grand strategy and military power certainly suggest that victory is possible in hybrid warfare. But it is also worth noting that, in this case, as in other examples such as Ireland, success came at a price: not only the obvious cost in lives and treasure but also in the deep resentment throughout the South at the results of the conflict that echoed well into the next century. That anger would lead not only to continued Southern hostility but also to the dark cancer of racism that shackled much of America's African American population and which spread from the South to much of the North in the decades after the Civil War. Only in the 1960s did the Civil Rights movement force the United States to recognize the level of national mendacity in how it had been treating a substantial body of its citizens.

There are, of course, ripples in the events surrounding wars that last well beyond the termination of conflicts.[22] However, in many ways, these

[21] Quoted in Gary W. Gallagher, "Blueprint for Victory, Northern Strategy and Military Policy," in James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., *Writing the Civil War, The Quest to Understand* (Columbia, SC, 1998), p. 18.

[22] For a discussion of the ripples in history, see Victor Davis Hanson, *Ripples of Battle: How Wars in the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think* (New York, 2003).

ripples seem most virulent and destructive in the case of hybrid conflicts. Such wars appear to be the most bitter because they involve the military and society so deeply. If that is the case with the American Civil War, then it is also true in the case of the Franco-Prussian War. On the surface, that conflict seems closer to the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century than to the wars of the people set in motion by the French Revolution. Certainly, the swiftness of the initial victories of Prusso-German forces at Metz and Sedan broke the military power of Napoleon III's bedraggled empire. Given the fact that the Battle of Königgrätz in 1866 had almost immediately led to peace between Austria and Prussia, Moltke and Bismarck had every expectation that the same pattern would emerge from the great victories their armies had won over the French in the opening months of the war. They were wrong.

In fact, the French turned to a levée en masse as they had in 1792. Thus, while the Prusso-German forces besieged Paris, they also confronted attacks on the siege lines from the periphery as well as wide-ranging guerrilla attacks on their lines of communications. After the defeat of the main French armies, the ensuing conflict became a fierce form of hybrid warfare. Two things saved the Prusso-German forces from disaster. The first was the fact that the disappearance of virtually the entire regular army of the French Empire into prisoner-of-war camps meant that there were no cadres on which to rebuild a new army, as had been the case in 1793.

Equally disastrous was the appearance of revolution, the Commune, in Paris, which split French nationalism into two camps, the more conservative of which was willing to deal with the Prusso-Germans to crush the specter of communist revolution. Nevertheless, for nearly half a year from the fall of Napoleon III's empire to the conclusion of an armistice, the Prusso-Germans confronted the problems involved in conducting the siege of Paris deep in France, while their lines of communications and foraging efforts were the targets of *franc tireurs* and more conventional French units attacking from the French countryside, which Moltke never had sufficient strength to hold.

In the long run, the German memory of the Franco-Prussian War, as well as the impact of the deep quarrels between Moltke and Bismarck, led to the development of two extraordinarily dangerous trends in German military thinking. The first emerged from Moltke's belief that statesmen should step back from conflicts and allow the generals to determine policy and strategy during the actual conduct of military operations. That anti-Clausewitzian belief then led to the even more dangerous belief,

which marked the thinking of generals such as Ludendorff, that military concerns should drive policy.

Thus emerged the argument that "military necessity" should rule all decision making – an approach to international relations that led to the development of the disastrous Schlieffen Plan.[23] At the tactical level, in 1914, the Germans believed they were again under attack by partisans – *franc tireurs* – and that the proper response was the path of utmost ruthlessness. Thus, because of "military necessity," namely to end the threat of guerrilla attacks, German troops would shoot some 6,000 French and Belgian civilian hostages because of a series of friendly fire incidents and ambushes by Belgians and the French in an attempt to defend their countries. That ruthlessness in turn would move much of American public opinion against the Central Powers and into the Allied camp, with disastrous strategic consequences for Germany.

HYBRID WAR IN THE MODERN ERA

It might seem strange to begin a discussion of modern hybrid warfare with a discussion of the all-consuming conflict of the Peninsular War. Yet, the war in Spain brought together many of the basic elements that were to characterize such wars in the twentieth century. In 1808, the French with their ideology of "liberty, fraternity, and equality" believed they were bringing a proven recipe of radical reform to a corrupt, inefficient, and grossly unfair ancien régime that, in their view, had completely lost its claim to legitimacy. After all, the Spanish people were obviously suffering under the rule of a church still dominated by the Inquisition, a nobility more interested in robbing the peasant serfs they ruled than in providing any semblance of justice, and a monarchy that had proven incapable of defending Spain and its empire for more than a century.

Certainly, to that child of the revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte, it was obvious that if any nation in Europe needed a reformation of its government, religion, and society, it was Spain. Ergo, in that wonderful logic that Descartes and other philosophes conveyed to French ruling elites, Napoleon believed that his armies, bearing the tide of revolutionary reform, would find themselves greeted as the liberators and creators of a new day. He was wrong. In many ways, Spain turned out to be the worst mistake of his career, even worse than the invasion of Russia in 1812. In

[23] In this respect, see the outstanding work by Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 2006).

the latter case, Napoleon lost an army but recovered sufficiently to almost defeat the allies in 1813. Had a substantial number of his soldiers not still found themselves involved in fighting in the "Spanish ulcer," matters in central Europe in that year might well have turned out differently.

The nature of the hybrid warfare on the Iberian Peninsula suggests how poorly Napoleon understood the nature of the Spanish people. For that matter, neither did Joseph nor the Emperor's marshals who ran most of the war, with the exception of Napoleon's brief foray in 1808 to restore a situation that was rapidly spinning out of control. Besides their obliviousness to the "other," the French possessed neither a clear strategy nor coherent goals. As usual with Napoleon, the emperor confused military strategy with grand strategy. In effect, the French marched into Spain believing that military victory, if even necessary, would be sufficient in and of itself to place Spain firmly under French control. Through the dismal years that followed French intervention, Napoleon and his marshals pursued the ghost of decisive victory in the belief that it would solve the problems the "Spanish ulcer" posed. In the end, they got a proper thrashing from Wellington, but one that the insurgencies throughout Spain had enabled.

On the other side of the hill it is easy, of course, to identify Wellington's campaigns as providing the conventional military threat that supported and enabled the many different insurgencies to attack French foraging parties, couriers, and lines of communications. Yet, one must also realize that Wellington, the British army, and their Portuguese allies spent much of their time in Portugal far from the insurgents. The fascinating aspect of the conflict is the role Spanish armies played in the hybrid struggle. Unwilling to cooperate with each other or, for that matter, with the British, ill equipped and ill trained, and consistently beaten in battle by the French armies, they remained in the field – a nuisance perhaps, but always nipping at the heels of the French. A modern war? Perhaps not, and yet the contrast between French ideals and their ignorance of Spain is striking. When the ideals proved to have little allure to the Spanish population, the French turned to seeking military victory, confusing that with political victory. Without a realistic strategic or political framework, they had no chance of achieving a successful outcome.

Throughout their imperial history, the British consistently confronted hybrid warfare in one form or another. Whereas the war to subdue the American colonists was an abject failure, the British record throughout the nineteenth century was much better. There were, of course, disasters, such as the catastrophe in Afghanistan in 1841, but for the most part

technological superiority was sufficient to crush conventional enemies in Africa and Asia, while politically astute agents and policies maintained peace and kept insurgencies from exploding within the borders of Britain's various colonies and dependencies. The Boer War, however, suggested that there were going to be troubles ahead in the twentieth century. It took a massive effort by the entire Empire, at least the white portions of it, to subdue the Dutch farmers, first in the conflict's conventional phase and then to crush the Boer commandos waging guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the British received considerable help in their efforts from the gross incompetence of the Boer leaders. In the end, a combination of ruthlessness (to include the introduction of concentration camps to the lexicon of human evil), overwhelming force, and staying power ended the conflict. But, in fact, the Boers were to be the real winners politically, at least until the collapse of the apartheid system in the 1990s.

Beyond the two great world wars, on which much of historical interest and research has focused and that witnessed their own subwars that resembled hybrid war, the twentieth century was to be dominated by hybrid warfare. In some cases, those states with superior technology and resources were able to win. The British were able to crush the hybrid war in Mesopotamia in 1920 with their huge technological advantage, but the cost of that conflict convinced them that they should allow the Iraqis a modicum of independence, which set that unhappy state on its way to eventual catastrophe.

The Second Sino-Japanese War is the most difficult to explain except in terms of the grossest forms of incompetence. The lack of moral courage on the part of Japan's political and military leaders led to a conflict that, as with the attack on Pearl Harbor, was unwinnable from the moment the Japanese fired the first shot. Here, only those drunk on their own superiority could have believed that Japan might actually be in a position to control all of China both militarily and politically. The resulting hybrid war stretched Japan to the breaking point militarily, politically, economically, and psychologically. Yet, the bizarre system of Japanese governance persisted almost to the end in confusing the narrow interests of the Kwantung Army with those of the Japanese nation. In this world where serious strategic analysis did not exist, the Japanese military system consistently confused hope and the army's martial prowess with reality and a general lack of resources.

The French fought three major hybrid wars in the twentieth century: the first against Moroccan rebels in the 1920s; the second against one

of the great revolutionaries in history, Ho Chi Minh[24]; and the third against the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front).[25] In the first case, the French, given their immense superiority in technology and resources, were able to win. The war in Indochina, in contrast, was an unmitigated disaster in military as well as political terms. Three major factors explain the French defeat. The first was the fact that France, devastated by defeat and German occupation, was simply incapable of winning a war against the Vietminh in the late 1940s. Second, the Chinese Communists were able to provide substantial aid to the Vietminh. But the third factor, the Vietminh leadership, was the most crucial. Not only was Ho Chi Minh a political genius, but the revolutionaries possessed in Vo Nguyén Giáp military genius as well. The conduct of the major battles around the Red River Delta and at Dien Bien Phu reflected the highest form of military competence, abilities that Giáp was to display again in the hybrid war he would fight against the Americans and South Vietnamese in the 1960s and 1970s.

Having suffered a humiliating defeat in Vietnam, the French then found themselves involved in a disastrous war against Algerian insurgents. In that hybrid war, the French won militarily by defeating the FLN's conventional forces and sending them reeling back across Algeria's frontiers with Morocco and Tunisia, crushing what forces were left in the back country and then winnowing out the terrorist network in the cities – all with the utmost ruthlessness. But, in the end, the army's victory went for naught because the very means that it had used to win the war militarily undermined the political consensus necessary to maintain Algeria as a part of metropolitan France.

CONCLUSION

A brief perusal of history would suggest that statesmen and military leaders should always regard war as a last resort because its cost in lives and treasure is rarely commensurate with its gains. World War II was undoubtedly a necessary war for the allied powers, but only the

[24] Ho Chi Minh participated in five major communist movements: He was a major participant in the founding of the French Communist Party, the Malayan Communist Party, and the Vietnamese Communist Party, and he was a major figure in both the Soviet Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party.

[25] The great movie *The Battle of Algiers* gives the impression that the Algerian fight for independence centered around the cities, but in fact it involved major conventional operations throughout the countryside.

United States came out of that conflict with its territory largely unscathed. Even then, the number of American military dead, 416,800, represented a terrible burden, although it was low in comparison to the losses of the other major powers. But of all the grisly forms that war takes, hybrid conflicts would appear to be the nastiest. There are no easy roads to victory in such conflicts. Moreover, in nearly every case in the past where the defender has used hybrid means, will has become a factor in the ultimate outcome as the conflict extended in time and space. Victory would seem to be a matter largely of a willingness to spend lives and resources in what one can only describe as a profligate fashion. The North clearly was willing to pay that price in fighting the Civil War, but it is worth noting that the terrible casualties the Army of the Potomac suffered in the spring 1864 campaign against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia came close to collapsing Northern morale and thus losing the war.

The major strategic lesson would seem to be obvious: Do not fight a hybrid war unless the most fundamental interests of the state are at stake. That calculation must rest on an ability to weigh the strategic calculus of means and ends, as well as a thorough understanding of one's opponent: his ideology, his commitment, his history, and his culture. The capacity of the American people to stay what will always be an extraordinarily difficult course is also a critical factor. Moreover, one must understand that there are inherently contradictory tendencies between the demands of conventional war to smash up the physical and human landscape and the demands of counterinsurgency warfare to protect the population and gain their trust and confidence. Given the watchful eyes of 24/7 news coverage and the proclivities of the American people, the strategy of creating a desert and calling it peace is no longer an option for American policy makers. Like it or not, they will have to find other ways to combat hybrid adversaries. In this endeavor, understanding the history of such conflicts would be a good place to start.