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Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

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Abstract

⁴⁶ In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote –

- 47 intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas,
- ⁴⁸ including researchers studying leadership and organizational behavior, personality science,
- 49 positive psychology, judgment and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and
- ⁵⁰ interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to studying
- intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring
- ⁵² intellectual humility and identify the common core: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the
- ⁵³ limitations of one's beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different
- ⁵⁴ measurement approaches, we highlight the role of factors that influence intellectual humility,
- ⁵⁵ from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence
- ⁵⁶ concerning benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making,
- interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise, and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that
- initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable intervent can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional, and cultural value.
- 60
- *Keywords*: beliefs, polarization, social conflict, metacognition, wisdom
- 62

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

Intellectual humility involves recognizing that there are gaps in one's knowledge and that one's current beliefs might be incorrect. For instance, someone might think that it is raining, but acknowledge that they have not looked outside and the sun might be out. Research on intellectual humility offers an intriguing proposition when facing human errors and biases: while we cannot rid ourselves of our limitations altogether, recognition of the limitations of one's knowledge may help to safeguard us from some of our more authoritarian, dogmatic, and biased proclivities.

Although acknowledging the limits of one's insights might be easy to do in low-stakes 71 situations, people are less likely to exhibit intellectual humility when the stakes are high. For 72 instance, people are unlikely to act in an intellectually humble manner when motivated by strong 73 convictions, or when their political, religious, or ethical values seem challenged ^{1,2}. Under such 74 circumstances, many people hold tightly to existing beliefs and fail to appreciate and 75 acknowledge the viewpoints of others³⁻⁶. These social phenomena have troubled scholars and 76 policymakers for decades ³ Consequently, interest in cultivating intellectual humility has come 77 from multiple research areas and sub-fields in psychology, including social-personality, 78 cognitive, clinical, educational, and leadership and organizational behavior ^{7–11}. Cumulatively, 79 scholars suggest that intellectual humility can decrease polarization, extremism, and 80 susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs as well as increase learning and discovery, and foster 81 scientific credibility^{12–15}. 82

The growing interdisciplinary interest in intellectual humility has led to multiple definitions and assessments, raising a question about commonality across definitions in the growing field. Claims about the concept's presumed societal and individual benefits further raise the question about the strength of evidence that supports these claims.

In this Review, we provide an overview of empirical intellectual humility research. We first examine approaches for defining and measuring intellectual humility across various subfields in psychology, synthesizing the common thread across seemingly disparate definitions. We next describe how individual, interpersonal, and cultural factors can work for or against intellectual humility. We conclude by highlighting the importance of intellectual humility and intervention approaches.

94 Defining intellectual humility

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Intellectual humility is conceptually distinct from general humility, modesty, perspective-95 taking, and open-mindedness⁹. Whereas general humility involves how people think about both 96 their shortcomings and strengths across domains, intellectual humility is chiefly concerned with 97 epistemic limitations ¹⁶. In a similar vein, modesty emphasizes increased social awareness and 98 not wanting to monopolize the spotlight or draw too much attention to one's accomplishments, 99 whereas intellectual humility focuses on recognizing one's ignorance and intellectual fallibility 100 ¹⁷. General humility and modesty are also psychometrically distinct from intellectual humility 101 18,19 102

103 There are subtle differences between intellectual humility and perspective-taking. 104 Perspective-taking is the ability to recognize and understand alternative points of view ²⁰. By 105 contrast, intellectual humility is the ability to recognize shortcomings or potential limitations in 106 one's own point of view. Building on perspective-taking, open-mindedness refers to unbiased or 107 fair consideration of different views regardless of one's beliefs ²¹. Although open-mindedness is 108 theoretically and empirically related to intellectual humility, being open-minded does not always involve considering the limitations of one's knowledge or beliefs 22,23 . Though distinct from

these related phenomena, intellectual humility has multiple definitions reflecting its use in different fields.

Intellectual humility has a wide range of philosophical roots ^{24–27}. Some philosophical 112 accounts focus on attributes of people who frequently exhibit intellectually humble thoughts and 113 behavior (such as the tendency to frequently recognize one's fallibility and owning one's 114 limitations)²⁸. Most accounts define intellectual humility as a virtuous balance between 115 intellectual arrogance (overly valuing one's beliefs) and intellectual diffidence (undervaluing 116 one's beliefs)^{28–30}. The latter definition has its roots in the Aristotelian ideal of the Golden Mean 117 -a calibration of particular virtues to the demands of the situation at hand^{30,31}. Because situations 118 vary in their demands, a logical consequence of the Aristotelian approach is that intellectual 119 humility is only virtuous as a dynamic, situation-sensitive construct $^{30-32}$. Simultaneously, the 120 Aristotelian approach means that the same psychological characteristics attributed to intellectual 121 humility are unlikely to always be virtuous³². 122


Psychological scientists also define intellectual humility in a myriad of ways. Some 123 scholars approach intellectual humility as a form of metacognition, reflecting how people 124 regulate and reflect on their beliefs and thoughts. This view emphasizes the inherent limitations 125 of human knowledge and beliefs, such as recognizing that beliefs might be wrong and that 126 opinions are based on partial information ^{9,29,33,34}. Other scholars approach intellectual humility 127 as a multidimensional phenomenon, advocating that intellectual humility includes a combination 128 of metacognition, valuing other people's beliefs, admitting one's ignorance or errors to other 129 people, and being motivated by an intrinsic desire to seek the truth $^{35-37}$. 130

Scholars favoring broader accounts of intellectual humility argue that a strict focus on 131 metacognition excludes appreciation for other people's insights, behavioral responses when one 132 recognizes that they might be wrong or confused, and motives for thinking and acting. In turn, 133 scholars who endorse a metacognitive account of intellectual humility argue that encumbering 134 intellectual humility with multiple features weakens the ability to examine it with conceptual 135 clarity and methodological rigor. For example, multidimensional instruments might be difficult 136 to interpret because a person high in one dimension and low in another could receive the same 137 intellectual humility score as someone with the opposite psychological profile. 138

Preference for these competing accounts of intellectual humility vary across sub-fields of 139 psychology, linked to methodological preferences and historical emphasis on social and 140 contextual factors. Cognitive psychologists tend to favor metacognitive accounts of intellectual 141 humility that emphasize how people think about evidence, knowledge, and beliefs, without much 142 attention to social contexts¹³. Conversely, developmental, educational, and clinical psychologists 143 tend to favor a multidimensional account that considers how real world, cognitive, behavioral, 144 and interpersonal factors come together to form intellectual humility³⁸⁻⁴⁰. Social and personality 145 psychologists, including in applied organizational sciences, consider metacognitive and 146 multidimensional accounts^{9,33}. Rather than endorsing a single definition, these researchers call 147 for a clear distinction when measuring unique features of intellectual humility to reveal how the 148 distinctive features relate to and shape one another ⁴¹. 149

A cumulative science of intellectual humility benefits from clear definitions and explicit modeling of relationships between psychological processes and behavioral outcomes. Despite different conceptual approaches, most philosophers and psychologists agree that intellectual humility necessarily includes recognizing one's ignorance and intellectual fallibility ²⁶. Hence, we focus on the metacognitive features of intellectual humility because they have consensus support from the scholarly community. Furthermore, these features are empirically plausible:

- they are scientifically testable and hence falsifiable. Taking a middle ground between
- metacognitive and multidimensional accounts, we argue that consideration of interpersonal
 contexts is beneficial to understanding how intellectual humility manifests, what factors inhibit
- contexts is beneficial to understanding how intellectual humility manifests, what factors inhibit and promote it, and how intellectual humility can be developed. At the same time, isolating the
- metacognitive core of intellectual humility permits scholars to identify its contextual and
- interpersonal correlates, and reduces the likelihood of mistakenly labeling different processes
- and outcomes as intellectual humility (jingle fallacy) or providing distinct names to the same
- family of metacognitive components of intellectual humility (jangle fallacy)⁴¹. Thus, we define
- intellectual humility in terms of a metacognitive core comprised of recognizing the limits of
- one's knowledge and awareness of one's fallibility (Fig. 1). This core is expressed by
- demonstrations of intellectual humility through behaviour and valuing others' intellect.
- 167 Figure 1.



168 **Conceptual representation of intellectual humility** | Infographic depicting the metacognitive 169 core (shaded region) and the peripheral social and behavioral (light region) features of 170 intellectual humility with scholarly consensus. The core includes the metacognitive components 171 of recognizing the limits of one's knowledge and being aware of one's fallibility. The social and 172 behavioral regions include recognizing that other people may hold legitimate beliefs different 173 from one's own, and being willing to reveal ignorance and confusion in order to learn. The 174 boundaries of the core and the outer region are permeable, indicating mutual influence of 175 metacognitive features of intellectual humility for social and behavioral aspects of the construct 176 and vice versa. 177

178 Measuring intellectual humility

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Psychological scientists have developed several measures of intellectual humility (Table 1). These measures can be organized in terms of purpose and type. In terms of purpose, some measures aim to capture intellectual humility as a trait – the degree to which people are intellectually humble in general – whereas others examine it as a state – the degree to which people are intellectually humble in specific contexts. In both cases, intellectual humility is measured along a continuum rather than in a binary all-or-nothing fashion.

One measurement type is to ask participants to self-report on their intellectual humility in 185 a questionnaire²⁶. Questionnaires are used to assess trait and state (including belief-specific) 186 intellectual humility. Another measurement type relies on behavioral tasks designed to elicit 187 meaningful differences in a particular kind of response. For example, a researcher might ask 188 people to play a game where the goal is to answer questions correctly and see how often 189 participants delegate questions to more knowledgeable peers-an indication that people realize 190 their own knowledge is incomplete (this task has been used to measure intellectual humility in 191 children³⁸). Both of these types can contribute to estimates of trait and state intellectual humility. 192

194 **Questionnaires.** Questionnaires are often used to assess intellectual humility. A trait questionnaire might ask how much a person, '[Accepts] that [their] beliefs and attitudes may be 195 wrong⁹. A belief-specific questionnaire on the issue of gun control might ask how much a 196 person '[recognizes] that [their] views about gun control are based on limited evidence'³³. A 197 state questionnaire might ask how intellectually humble a person feels in the moment or how 198 much they 'searched actively for reasons why [their] beliefs might be wrong' during a recent 199 disagreement or conflict ³⁷. A closely related self-report measure asks people indicate, for 200 example, their attitude change or depth of understanding; these self-report tasks have also been 201 used as indirect measures of intellectual humility⁴². 202

Over the last decade, psychological scientists have developed many questionnaire 203 measures of intellectual humility at the trait level ²⁶. The popularity of these measures is due to 204 some level of predictive capacity and cost-effectiveness. People seem capable of reporting on 205 their trait level of intellectual humility with some degree of accuracy, as supported by small-to-206 moderate, positive correlations between self-reported intellectual humility and peer-reported 207 intellectual humility ^{9,11,19,43}. Scores on self-reported trait-level intellectual humility (across 208 different measures) are also positively associated to scores on self-report measures of other 209 epistemic traits, such as intellect and open-mindedness, and to concrete behaviors understood to 210 be central to (or diagnostic of) intellectual humility, including information seeking, cognitive 211 flexibility, acknowledgement of intellectual failings, and argument evaluation^{9,11,19,43,44}. 212

Nevertheless, trait-level questionnaires of intellectual humility have limitations. It may be 213 difficult for people to report on how intellectually humble they are in general because doing so 214 requires them to integrate a lot of information when forming an overall judgement about 215 themselves. All questionnaires rely on subjective judgments and are therefore vulnerable to 216 response biases, including not accurately recalling one's past experience, selecting positive 217 responses on the measure by default, seeing oneself more positively than is warranted, and 218 focusing on favorable group comparisons when evaluating one's behavior – but reporting on 219 how intellectually humble one is in general provides numerous opportunities for error^{45,46}. 220

Finally, it is difficult to assess socially desirable constructs with self-report measures. 221 Scores obtained via trait-style measures of intellectual humility positively correlate with social 222 desirability bias. In situations where intellectual humility is desirable, like a job interview, self-223 report questionnaires make it easy to create a false impression of high intellectual humility^{47,48}. 224 Notably, response biases are attenuated when intellectual humility questionnaires ask people to 225 report how intellectually humble they were in specific interpersonal situations in their lives, 226 highlighting the value of more contextualized assessment of responses to specific situations (or 227 states)⁴⁹. In particular, reporting on how one searched for information or whether one recognized 228 their fallibility during a specific event does not require as much mental effort because of access 229 to specific memory cues, compared to reporting on how intellectually humble one is across 230 situations. In addition, when recalling a specific situation, a desire to present oneself in a positive 231 light might be trumped by a stronger desire to provide an honest response about a particular 232 event. Thus, questionnaires that ask about intellectual humility in specific situations or relevant 233 to specific events in people's lives might be less vulnerable to response bias than questionnaires 234 that measure trait-level intellectual humility. 235

In sum, trait-level questionnaires are an efficient tool for obtaining an initial, general picture about one's intellectual humility. However, these scores should be considered in light of their limitations.

Although trait measures can be useful for describing typical ways of being in the world, 239 they are not particularly good at detecting variability. Thus, they are not well-suited to studying 240 how intellectual humility might vary in daily life or change in response to an intervention. In 241 response to these limitations, some researchers have examined intellectual humility in specific 242 contexts or in response to specific issues. Scholars studying these questions have developed state 243 specific questionnaires of one's beliefs, reasoning, or behaviour that tap people's level of 244 intellectual humility about specific issues, such as gun control, vaccine mandates, or more 245 mundane interpersonal disagreements ^{37,49,50}. State measures enable researchers to capture how 246 people's intellectual humility varies as they move through various contexts and situations in their 247 life ^{37,50,51}. 248

Focus on state-specific measures echoes a modern take on personality science, which 249 defines a trait via a person's profile of states^{52,53}. A person's general profile—when aggregating 250 across state-specific expression of a characteristic—is typically stable over time. At the same 251 time, state-specific expression of a characteristic will be systematically variable from one 252 situation to the next. Indeed, daily diary and experience-sampling studies demonstrate substantial 253 within-personal variability in intellectual humility ^{37,50}. Although individuals differ in their trait-254 level intellectual humility, they can also demonstrate a high degree of systematic variation 255 depending on the demands of specific contexts. Capturing only global self-perceptions of 256 intellectual humility with a trait measure glosses over this variability and nuance. 257

When researchers are interested in people's overall patterns of intellectual humility across situations and variability from situation to situation, we recommend integrating state and trait approaches by taking repeated situation-specific assessments. We recommend reports of intellectual humility in the context of specific situations. Ideally these assessments should be administered multiple times. We only recommend using trait-level assessments of intellectual humility in research focused on people's global attributions of intellectual humility to themselves (self-reports) or close others (informant reports). A profile of intellectual humility can further be
 established by modeling responses across multiple situations.

If researchers are solely interested in participants' general self-perceptions of intellectual humility, trait assessments might be suitable, with caveats outlined above. Notably, little work has directly compared benefits of trait assessments of intellectual humility to repeated situationspecific assessments of intellectual humility, calling for further research on this topic.

Behavioural tasks. A key advantage of behavioral tasks over other measures is that their 271 scores do not typically depend on subjective judgements and are therefore not as prone to 272 response biases and faking ^{45,47,48}. For example, measuring whether a person delegates a question 273 to a more knowledgeable peer captures a real behavior in the moment, in contrast to a self-report 274 of a person's impression of their behavior in general or in a past situation. In addition, behavioral 275 tasks depend less on language than questionnaires and might therefore be better for assessing 276 intellectual humility in young children or in different cultural contexts. Behavioral tasks also put 277 all participants in the same situation with the same opportunity to exhibit intellectual humility. In 278 comparison, estimates of intellectual humility via questionnaires suffers from the confound of 279 natural variability in opportunity to be intellectually humble in daily life. 280

Nonetheless, custom-designed behavioral tasks can be less effective at measuring typical 281 rather than extraordinary performance ⁵⁴. Experimental tasks capture only a small segment of 282 behavior in an artificial situation contrived by a researcher. A participant might be highly 283 motivated to perform well on the task by displaying high levels of intellectual humility, 284 rendering a score that captures their maximal capacity rather than their typical or externally-valid 285 intellectual humility. Behavioral measures also assume that the assessed behavior is motivated 286 by recognizing one's ignorance and intellectual fallibility, which might not always be the case. 287 Such behavior may be motivated by situational pressures or other processes not characteristic of 288 intellectual humility. 289

Behavioural tasks typically sample situation-specific responses, presenting a challenge for scholars interested in a general, trait-level picture of intellectual humility. It might be possible to administer behavioral tasks multiple times to obtain a more complete picture of someone's typical behavior. However, repeated exposure to the same task risks undermining score validity as participants become more familiar with what they are asked to do, bored, or more fluent with the task procedures.

Overall, behavioral tasks offer another useful measurement approach for assessing intellectual humility to complement questionnaires. Nevertheless, the development and use of behavioral tasks has lagged behind questionnaires. No research has yet developed a valid intellectual humility behavioral task by performing psychometric testing of theoretically expected associations with other constructs and outcomes, in contrast to the many published studies doing so for questionnaires. Validation of behavioral tasks to assess intellectual humility is an important direction for future research.

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304 Threats to intellectual humility

Being intellectually humble involves embracing uncertainty and ambiguity, and entertaining the possibility that even one's closely held beliefs might be incorrect ⁹. Thus, intellectual humility requires people to deliberately remain flexible in their beliefs ¹¹. However,

many aspects of human psychology run counter to intellectual humility. We provide a non-

exhaustive review of the personal, interpersonal, and cultural factors that often work againstintellectual humility.

Personal and interpersonal factors. When people try to reason through an issue, they 311 often work hard to find evidence that confirms their perspective^{55–58}. This process is often called 312 confirmation or myside bias. Some theorists suggest that reasoning abilities have evolved to 313 justify oneself and defend one's reputations in front of others, so looking for confirmatory 314 evidence to convince others of one's good standing is a default strategy^{59,60}. Because 315 confirmatory search likely directs attention to arguments in support of one's initial beliefs (rather 316 than to the limits of one's beliefs and their fallibility), this bias might act as a metacognitive 317 limitation counter to intellectual humility in many situations. 318

Even when a person desires to be intellectually humble, recognizing the limits of 319 knowledge requires overcoming further metacognitive limitations that distort self-appraisal. For 320 example, people tend to confidently overestimate how much they know about various 321 phenomena —such as how a zipper works, how snow forms, how a helicopter takes flight — and 322 only become aware of their lack of knowledge after failing to explain the phenomenon $^{61-64}$. 323 Moreover, people often fail to distinguish their knowledge from the knowledge of other people. 324 Simply being aware that others understand how something works can result in people 325 overestimating how much they understand the same phenomenon⁶⁵. Therefore, people struggle to 326 recognize the limits of their knowledge and their fallibility-two core features of intellectual 327 humility. 328


Intellectual humility also involves accepting uncertainty about one's beliefs. Although 329 people differ in their tolerance of uncertainty and ambiguity, many find uncertainty disquieting 330 or avoid it altogether in situations that are personally threatening ⁶⁶. To overcome the threat, 331 people tend to become more self-focused and eager to cling to unambiguous, comforting beliefs, 332 rather than seek to understand more ambiguous truths ^{34,67}. Consequently, personal threats can 333 lead to thinking in terms of extremes and absolutes ('black and white' thinking) and an 334 unwillingness to recognize one's own limited perspective and potential fallibility ^{68–71}. For 335 example, people who were made to feel highly threatened became less comfortable considering 336 opposing political opinions and were more wary of members of political outgroups compared to 337 people who were made to feel moderately threatened ⁷². Feelings of personal threat may 338 therefore interfere with the ability to exhibit intellectual humility. 339

Intellectual humility can also be hard to manifest and sustain when acknowledging the 340 limitations of one's beliefs risks compromising interpersonal relationships. When members of 341 cultural, religious, political, or other social groups conform to the group's ideology, they feel 342 closer to one another ^{73–76}. Thus, people might reflexively adhere to their groups' beliefs to 343 strengthen relationships with other members of the group ^{77–79}. Group solidarity might therefore 344 trump intellectual humility. For example, when embedded within ideologically homogeneous 345 (versus varied) social networks, people become more resistant over time to changing their 346 ideological beliefs—a tendency diametrically opposite to intellectual humility ^{80,81}. When a 347 'group's truth' collides with reality, intellectual humility will be hard to come by. 348

The motive to attain status within one's community might also work against intellectual humility ⁸². Group members often gain prestige and rank by fervently endorsing the group's ideology ^{57,83–85}. Espousing the group's beliefs serves as a form of self-persuasion, further convincing people that the views they endorse must be correct, while moving further away from
 intellectual humility ^{86–88}.

However, fervently endorsing a group's ideology does not mean that one is unlikely to show intellectual humility in general. People might endorse their group's political dogmas while also being mindful of their intellectual limitations when arguing with individuals within the group. People become more intellectually humble during interpersonal conflicts when they feel connected to their group compared to situations when they feel disconnected^{42,89}. This insight suggests that one might show little intellectual humility when endorsing group dogmas, while

- simultaneously displaying intellectual humility with close others (in the group). This situational
- dependency underlines the variability of intellectual humility as a construct.
- 362 *Figure 2*.



- 363 364
- 365

Threats to intellectual humility | Figure depicting threats to intellectual humility at the cultural, 366 interpersonal, and individual levels. Threats pertaining to each level are outlined on the right side 367 of the figure. These threats include various metacognitive limitations, such as biased information 368 search, overestimation of knowledge, failing to recognize unknowns as well as situational 369 factors. The arrows between the various threats depict the unidirectional (single tipped) and 370 mutual (double tipped) influence each threat has on the other threats. That is, the presence of one 371 threat increases the likelihood that the other threats will emerge. Specific threats can further 372 accentuate and interact with processes at other (broader or more specific) levels in a form of 373 cross-level interactions. On the left side, the smaller circle contained within larger circles depict 374 an individual contained within interpersonal and cultural spheres. These spheres represent threats 375 that apply at the broader level, as well as threats that apply at the more specific level of the 376 individual. 377

Cultural factors. Cultural contexts shape the way people think and process information 378 ^{90,91} and have the potential to influence whether they think in intellectually humble ways. For 379 instance, people living in societies that emphasize interdependence in social coordination (such 380 as Japan) tend to reflect on mental states of others more, define the self through relationships 381 with others, and are better able to avoid underweighting contextual information, relative to 382 people living in more independent contexts, such as the United States ^{92,93}. More generally, 383 societies that emphasize interdependence rather than independence are more likely to promote 384 relational goals, paying attention to social cues, defining the self as embedded within one's social 385 environment, and social context vigilance ^{92–95}. Furthermore, people in communities that rely on 386 interdependent social coordination for their food, such as fishing or rice farming, display more 387 sensitivity to contextual information than people from communities that rely on individual-388 focused herding or wheat farming 96,97 . 389

Consideration of contextual information and mentalizing might be conducive to greater 390 recognition of the limits of one's knowledge and awareness of one's fallibility. Indeed, there is 391 some evidence for within and between country differences in intellectual humility. Within China, 392 people who rely on rice farming tend to display greater intellectual humility when reflecting on 393 social conflicts compared to people who rely on wheat farming ⁹⁸. In cross-cultural comparisons, 394 individuals from countries that emphasize social coordination more, such as Japan or China, 395 spontaneously show more intellectual humility in reflections on social conflicts compared to 396 individuals in the US and Canada ^{99,100}. 397

Overall, intellectual humility can be influenced by many factors, from the cognitive 398 habits people have to the cultural contexts they inhabit. Individuals are usually motivated to 399 confirm their prior beliefs, to feel like they know more than they actually do, and to avoid 400 opposing opinions when threatened. A desire to maintain interpersonal bonds can also tempt 401 people to blindly believe in group "truths." Simultaneously, people's interpersonal and cultural 402 contexts can make them more or less intellectually humble when dealing with others. Feeling 403 accepted by one's peers may promote intellectually humility during social conflicts. Finally, 404 interdependent cultural contexts that require a high level of social coordination tend to promote 405 ways of thinking that are sensitive to context and conducive to intellectual humility 406 407

408 Importance of intellectual humility

The willingness to recognize the limits of one's knowledge and fallibility can confer 409 societal and individual benefits if expressed in the right moment and to the proper extent. This 410 latter insight echoes the philosophical roots of intellectual humility as a virtue^{30,31}. State and trait 411 intellectual humility have been associated with a range of cognitive, social, and personality 412 variables (Table 2). At the societal level, intellectual humility can promote societal cohesion by 413 reducing group polarisation and encouraging harmonious inter-group relationships. At the 414 individual level, intellectual humility can have important consequences for well-being, decision-415 making, and academic learning. 416

Notably, empirical research has provided little evidence on how generalizable the
benefits or drawbacks of intellectual humility are beyond the unique contexts of WEIRD
(Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) people⁹⁰. With this caveat aside,
below is an initial set of findings concerning the implications of possessing high levels of state or
trait intellectual humility. Unless otherwise specified, the evidence below concerns trait-level

intellectual humility. After reviewing these benefits, we consider attempts to improve anindividual's intellectual humility.

Social implications. People higher in intellectual humility are more likely to display 424 tolerance of opposing political and religious views, exhibit less hostility toward members of 425 those opposing groups, and are more likely to resist derogating outgroup members as 426 intellectually and morally bankrupt ^{101–103}. Although intellectually humbler people are capable of 427 intergroup prejudice¹⁰⁴, they are more willing to question themselves and to consider rivaling 428 viewpoints relative to those lower in intellectual humility¹⁰⁴. Indeed, people with greater 429 intellectual humility display less myside bias, expose themselves to opposing perspectives more 430 often, and show greater openness to befriending outgroup members on social media platforms 431 ^{19,22,102}. By comparison, people with lower intellectual humility display features of cognitive 432 rigidity and are more likely to hold inflexible opinions and beliefs ^{9,11}. 433

In addition to being associated with intergroup tolerance, intellectual humility is also 434 associated with engaged cooperation with outgroup members. In both state and trait form, 435 intellectually humbler people are more willing to let outgroup members speak freely and show 436 greater interest in joining bipartisan groups aimed at discussing political issues ^{34,105}. Individuals 437 showing greater state intellectual humility are also more cooperative after thinking through their 438 position in a public goods game, where they have to decide how much to contribute to a common 439 pool that will be redistributed to all players, an effect which contrasts with the typical finding 440 that deliberation leads to greater selfishness ^{106,107}. People showing higher intellectual humility 441 are therefore less likely to demonize groups with opposing views and tend to be open to the 442 possibility for engagement and cooperation. 443

Intellectual humility is also associated with intentions to forgive and reconcile with others who hurt one or offended one's beliefs ^{40,108}. Furthermore, intellectual humility might support interpersonal cohesion by reducing derogative behaviors during arguments, such as labeling opponents as malicious or unintelligent ¹⁹. ¹¹⁷Close-minded thinking can lead individuals to disparage others' opinions or arguments ¹⁰⁹. Conversely, intellectual humility is associated with open-mindedness and a willingness to learn about differing perspectives, which might promote respectful debate ¹⁹.

The willingness to acknowledge one's intellectual limitations might also have important 451 implications for interpersonal relationships. Intellectual humility is positively associated with 452 multiple values, including empathy, gratitude, altruism, benevolence, and universalism, which 453 suggests that people with greater intellectual humility are more likely to value and care about the 454 well-being of others ¹¹⁰. Intellectual humility might also be instrumental in maintaining 455 interpersonal relationships in the face of social adversity. For example, state intellectual humility 456 is associated with higher positive affect and sense of closeness toward others following an 457 interpersonal conflict ¹¹¹. 458

Overall, people reporting greater intellectual humility tend to be more open to opposing perspectives and more forgiving of others' offenses. However, because reviewed empirical evidence is cross-sectional, it remains to be seen whether intellectual humility causes these social benefits.

Individual benefits. Intellectual humility might also have direct consequences for
 individuals' wellbeing. People who reason about social conflicts in an intellectually humbler
 manner, and consider others' perspectives (components of wise reasoning) are more likely to ,
 report higher levels of life satisfaction and less negative affect compared to people who do not ⁴¹.

Leaders who are higher in intellectual humility are also higher in emotional intelligence and receive higher satisfaction ratings from their followers, which suggests intellectual humility could benefit professional life ^{112,113}. Nonetheless, intellectual humility is not associated with personal wellbeing in all contexts: religious leaders who see their religious beliefs as fallible experience lower wellbeing relative to leaders who are less intellectually humble in their beliefs ¹¹⁴.

Intellectual humility might also help people make well-informed decisions. Intellectually humbler people are better able to differentiate between strong versus weak arguments, even if those arguments go against their initial beliefs ⁹. Intellectual humility may also protect against memory distortions. Intellectually humbler people are less likely to falsely claim that they have seen certain statements before¹¹⁵. Likewise, intellectually humbler people are more likely to scrutinize misinformation and are more likely to intend to receive the COVID-19 vaccine ^{116,117}.

Lastly, intellectual humility is positively associated with knowledge acquisition, learning, and educational achievement. Intellectually humbler people are more motivated to learn and more knowledgeable about general facts ³⁹. Intellectually humbler high schoolers and university students expend greater effort when learning difficult material, are more receptive to assignment feedback, and earn higher grades ^{14,118}.

⁴⁸⁴ Despite evidence of individual benefits associated with intellectual humility, much of this ⁴⁸⁵ work is correlational. Therefore, associations may be the product of such confounding factors as ⁴⁸⁶ agreeableness, intelligence, or even general virtuousness. Longitudinal or experimental studies ⁴⁸⁷ are needed to address the question whether and under what circumstances intellectual humility ⁴⁸⁸ promotes individual benefits. Notably, the philosophical theorizing about situation-specific ⁴⁸⁹ virtuousness of the construct suggests that high levels of intellectual humility are unlikely to ⁴⁹⁰ benefit all people in all situations^{30,31}.

Improving intellectual humility. Given the benefits of intellectual humility in various contexts, it might be desirable to increase one's level of intellectual humility. Daily diary and experience sampling studies, along with cross-cultural surveys, show that people's level of intellectual humility systematically varies within and across individuals facing different ecological and situational demands, creating opportunities for intervention ^{34,37,50,119}. Initial evidence suggests several promising techniques for boosting intellectual humility.


Some experiments have documented short-term gains in intellectual humility following 497 brief reflection, writing, or reading exercises carefully designed to shift intellectual humility in 498 the moment. Participants showed higher levels of intellectual humility after reflecting on 499 experiences by taking a step back and envisioning oneself from the vantage point of a distant 500 observer (self-distanced), rather than imagining oneself living out a particular situation (self-501 immersed)³⁴. In other experiments, participants self-reported higher levels of intellectual 502 humility after reflecting on trust betrayal scenarios of real-life events involving disagreements or 503 interpersonal conflicts from self-distanced rather than a self-immersed perspective^{1,120}. In a series 504 of studies on the "illusion of understanding," people also overestimated their self-reported 505 knowledge of a policy less after writing a detailed explanation of how that policy works, thereby 506 recognizing that their knowledge of the policy was less complete than they originally thought 507 ^{63,121,122}. Likewise, people reported less confidence when answering a question if they first 508 identified their 'known unknowns' by listing two things they did not know ¹²³. In another study, 509 simply reading about the benefits of being intellectually humble, as opposed to being highly 510 certain, also boosted self-reported intellectual humility¹¹⁸. Similarly, reading a short, persuasive 511 article about intelligence being a malleable characteristic that can be developed, as compared to a 512

fixed characteristic that is mostly genetically determined, increased self-reported state
 intellectual humility¹⁹. These studies collectively suggest that intellectual humility can be
 temporary boosted through simple, low-cost techniques.

Though promising, most of these experiments were run on small to medium-sized 516 samples and have not been subject to replication. Two exceptions are the self-distancing effect, 517 which has been replicated in several studies, and the illusion of understanding work. The latter 518 originally showed that writing a detailed explanation of how a policy worked reduced both 519 overestimation of knowledge and attitude extremity¹²¹. A close replication of the original study 520 reduced overestimation of knowledge but did not change people's extreme attitudes. ¹²⁴. In 521 addition, the majority of studies reviewed above used self-report questionnaires to measure 522 intellectual humility or indicators of intellectual humility. Results corroborated with behavioral 523 measures and larger, more representative samples would shed more light on the extent to which 524 brief techniques can boost intellectual humility. 525

A few intervention studies have sought to train intellectual humility and measure the 526 effects of this training over longer time-periods than within a single session. In a randomized 527 control trial, participants were assigned to a month-long diary activity that was either self-528 distanced – the intervention condition – or self-immersed – the comparison condition. 529 Participants in the intervention group wrote daily reflections on significant issues from a self-530 distanced perspective, and those in the comparison group did the same from a self-immersed 531 perspective. Participants in the intervention group showed higher positive change in intellectual 532 humility (coded from written narratives) when examining responses at the end of the month 533 (after the intervention) to those at the beginning of the month (before the intervention), compared 534 to the participants in the control group ¹²⁵. Two further studies sought to increase intellectual 535 humility through secondary and undergraduate philosophy courses. In one quasi-experimental 536 study, a lesson on intellectual humility was either included at the beginning of a five-week 537 philosophy class or not. Undergraduates who received the lesson showed greater levels of 538 compromise-seeking in conflicts and were perceived by their peers as having higher intellectual 539 humility than those in a control group at the end of the course, though the lesson did not increase 540 self-reported intellectual humility¹²⁶. Likewise, participation in a week-long philosophy summer 541 camp for at least three years non-significantly increased self-reported intellectual humility 542 among high school and middle school students relative to a control group who only attended one 543 or two week-long sessions of the camp ¹²⁷. However, neither of the latter two interventions used 544 a randomized design, so selection bias – where one comparison group systematically differs from 545 the other on a variable other than receiving the intervention – may be responsible for the effects. 546 Overall, research supports the use of self-distanced diary writing to increase intellectual humility. 547 By contrast, evidence remains limited and inconclusive on whether intellectual humility can be 548 increased with classroom teaching. 549

550 *Figure 3*.



551 552

Psychological strategies to boost intellectual humility | Figure depicting the process model 553 through which situational triggers (unshaded box) may either result in greater intellectual 554 humility (dark shaded, rightmost box) or intellectual arrogance (lightly shaded, rightmost box). 555 The central box (partially shaded) depicts strategies that boost intellectual humility (black text) 556 and strategies that hinder intellectual humility (red text). Whereas some construal interventions 557 such as self-distancing and consideration of potential for growth, as well as broader 558 metacognitive interventions such as helping to puncture the illusion of explanatory depth help to 559 boost intellectual humility, other strategies such as self-immersing or rigid focus on stability can 560 result in failure to acknowledge fallibility and limits of knowledge. 561

562 563

Summary and future directions

Recognizing one's ignorance and intellectual fallibility are core features of intellectual humility. Intellectually humbler people appear to be more curious, better liked as leaders, and tend to make more thorough, well-informed decisions. Intellectually humbler people also seem more open to cooperating with those whose views differ from their own. These habits of mind seem to be vital for confronting many of the challenges facing societies today, and are beneficial to laypeople, policy makers, and scientists (Box 1).

Despite the wealth of current insights on intellectual humility, a range of critical themes remain unexplored. One challenge is to understand when exactly intellectual humility becomes too much of a good thing. Arguably, contexts calling for judgment by a certain deadline and/or based on a pre-defined set of existing facts (such as in a legal court, in a war room, or in executive business meetings) can only benefit from intellectual humility when permitted by time and due process of law. In moments that require decisive action, focusing on one's fallibility and

⁵⁷⁶ limits of knowledge might not be the best strategy. Intuitions about the bounded utility of

intellectual humility are corroborated by qualitative interviews with military personnel and
business employees ¹²⁸. Moreover, situational contexts in which intellectual humility helps or
does not help remain unexplored. Research identifying when and for whom intellectual humility
becomes disadvantageous would help address this gap in the psychological science of intellectual
humility.

Most research on intellectual humility has approached it as a relatively stable way that a 582 particular person behaves across situations³². More work is required to understand how 583 intellectual humility varies within a particular person in different situations and domains, and 584 how organizations and cultures differ in intellectual humility. Future work will need to explore 585 the causal links between a culture's emphasis on interdependence in social coordination and 586 intellectual humility. Studies that measure intellectual humility across multiple domains and in 587 multiple societies ⁹⁹ will also lead to a better understanding of how cultural social coordination 588 might shape intellectual humility in different domains. For example, large threats like war, 589 natural disasters, or pandemics might increase the need for interdependence in social 590 coordination, creating a culture that encourages people to be intellectually humble during social 591 conflict with close friends and family. In turn, this intellectual humility might increase the 592 capacity for social coordination at the expense of intellectual humility with strangers or those 593 who question ideological orthodoxies, to safeguard social coordination from further threat ⁹⁹. 594

Interventions offer another avenue for future research. It remains to be seen whether 595 interventions to boost intellectual humility can meaningfully address difficult societal problems 596 such as polarization, misinformation, and conspiracy beliefs. Perhaps helping individuals 597 become more aware of their intellectual fallibility can address such problems. Intellectual 598 humility interventions might need to also incorporate social-contextual elements, such as 599 changing organizational cultures, to produce meaningful improvements. Interventions should 600 also measure changes in intellectual humility over a longer period of time to test whether and 601 how long effects endure, and to identify interventions of optimal strengths to induce long-lasting 602 change in intellectual humility¹²⁹. 603

Future research should also explore the role of larger cultural forces, such as media 604 landscapes and public communication, in promoting or reducing intellectual humility. Public 605 figures are often denigrated in the media for changing their minds or admitting mistakes ¹³⁰. 606 News media also typically avoids reporting areas of uncertainty or ambiguity in favor of black-607 and-white stories, even though communicating uncertainty can promote trust in science^{131–133} 608 (though see¹³⁴). Individuals might only be able to embrace intellectual humility to the extent that 609 institutions validate and support it. Thus, interventions that normalize intellectually humility in 610 public communication should be studied for the potential impact on both individuals and 611 societies. 612

In the spirit of intellectual humility, we conclude by pointing out that intellectual humility is not a panacea. Although it has promise to counter societal incivility and misinformation, intellectual humility is cognitively effortful and is insufficient for addressing many other societal challenges. Moreover, a systemic approach is needed to foster intellectual humility at scale. Such an approach could involve a range of incremental changes that afford each person greater recognition of the limits of their knowledge and awareness of their fallibility. This approach to fostering intellectual humility calls for societal change in educational, scientific, and business cultures: away from treating intellectual humility as a weakness and toward treating it as a core
 value that is celebrated and reinforced. Individual-focused interventions to boost intellectual
 humility are not likely to be effective in the long term without corresponding societal changes.

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Box 1: Intellectual humility in science

The scientific enterprise is inherently imbued with uncertainty: When new data emerge, older 625 ideas and models ought to be revised to accommodate the new findings. Thus, intellectual 626 humility might be particularly important for scientists because it enables scientific progress. 627 Acknowledging the fallibility of scientific results via replication studies can help scientists revise 628 their beliefs about evidence for particular scientific phenomena¹⁴⁹. Furthermore, scientific claims 629 are typically probabilistic, and communication of the full finding requires communication of 630 uncertainty intervals around estimates. For example, within psychology, most phenomena are 631 multidetermined and complex. Moreover, most new psychological findings are provisional, with 632 a gap between laboratory observation and application in real-world contexts. Finally, most 633 findings in psychological sciences focus on explaining the past, and are not always well 634 equipped for predicting reactions to critical social issues¹⁵⁰. Critically, prediction is by definition 635 more uncertain than (post-hoc) explanation, yet at the same time in most instances it is also of 636 greater practical value. Focusing on predictions to test understanding of causal models in 637 sciences can be a powerful way to foster intellectual humility. In turn, emphasizing the general 638 value of intellectual humility can help scientists to commit to predictions, even if such 639 predictions turn out to be wrong. 640

Because of uncertainty around singular scientific findings, communication of scientific 641 insights to policy makers, journalists, and the public requires scientists to be intellectually 642 humble¹⁵. Despite worry by some scientists that communicating uncertainty would lower public 643 trust in science^{151,152}, there is little conclusive evidence to support this claim¹⁵³. Whereas 644 communicating consensus uncertainty, that is uncertainty in expert opinions on an issue, can 645 have negative effects for trust¹⁵⁴, communicating technical uncertainty in estimates or models via 646 confidence intervals or similar techniques has either positive or null effects for perception of 647 scientific credibility¹⁵⁴. At the same time, members of the public who show greater intellectual 648 humility are better able to separate scientific facts from misinformed fictions. 649 Although intellectual humility is foundational for science, scientists often shy away from 650 reporting complex data patterns, preferring (often unrealistically) clear, 'groundbreaking' 651 results¹⁵. Recognition of the limits of knowledge and of theoretical models can be beneficial for 652 increasing credibility within the scientific community. Embracing intellectual humility in science 653 via transparent and systematic reporting on limitations of scientific models and constraints on 654 generality has the potential to improve the scientific enterprise¹⁵⁵. Within science, intellectual 655 humility could help reduce the file-drawer problem-the publication bias toward statistically 656 significant or otherwise desired results, calibrate scientific claims to the relevant evidence, buffer 657 against exaggeration, prevent motivated cognition and selective reporting of results that affirm 658 one's hypotheses, and increase the tendency to welcome critique of one's work by other scholars. 659

Table 1. Measures of intellectual humility

Definition	Metacognitive emphasis	Approach	Aspect	Туре
Multi-dimensional trait of self-oriented and other-oriented facets, characteristic way of	Limits of knowledge +	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
responding to new ideas, seeking out new information, being mindful of others' feelings, and reactions in intellectual engagements ¹³⁵	Fallibility awareness			
Acknowledging the limitations of one's knowledge; accurately representing one's knowledge to other people, and being open to others' input ³⁸	Limits of knowledge	Multidimensional	Trait	Behavioral task
Absence of self-enhancement motive and egotistical bias. Ability to be objective with respect to one's beliefs ¹³⁶	Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Placing an adequate level of confidence in one's beliefs, revising beliefs when needed, and being willing to consider other people's beliefs ^{35,37}	Limits of knowledge + Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait & State	Questionnaire
Having an accurate view of one's intellectual strengths and weaknesses and being respectful of others' ideas ¹⁰¹	Limits of knowledge + Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
The mindset and actions associated with treating one's own views (such as beliefs, opinions, and positions) as fallible ¹³⁷	Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Recognizing that a particular personal view or belief might be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of that view or belief and to one's own limitations in obtaining and evaluating information relevant to it ³³	Fallibility awareness	Metacognitive	State	Questionnaire
Same as ³³ but using a trait rather than belief-specific approach ⁹	Fallibility awareness	Metacognitive	Trait	Questionnaire
The capacity to remain cognitively open to counterarguments particularly when the counterargument poses some threat ⁴²	Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	State	Questionnaire
Recognizing the limits of one's knowledge ^{1,49,99}	Limits of knowledge	Metacognitive	State	Questionnaire, content analysis
A non-threatening awareness of one's intellectual fallibility ^{39,138}	Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Having insights about the limits of one's knowledge and regulating intellectual arrogance in relationships ⁴⁰	Limits of knowledge	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Low self-focus and little concern for status, caring most about the intrinsic value of knowledge and truth ¹³⁹	Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Willingness to recognize the limits of one's knowledge and appreciate others' intellectual strengths ¹⁹	Limits of knowledge	Multidimensional	Trait	Questionnaire
Openness to information that might conflict with one's personal views and relatively weak needs to enhance one's ego ⁸⁹	Limits of knowledge + Fallibility awareness	Multidimensional	State	Questionnaire

Note. Emerging research efforts measure intellectual humility with automated natural language processing techniques, promising to side-step issues concerning self-report biases common to questionnaire measures ¹⁴⁰. Future work will be able to speak to the validity of this approach for measuring intellectual humility at scale.

Domain	Variable	Direction	Clarity of Evidence
Cognitive	Cognitive Ability ^{11,38,39,105}	Mixed	Unclear
C	Dogmatism ^{9,35,140,141}	Negative	Clear
	Need for Cognition ^{9,18,19,39}	Positive	Clear
	Need for Cognitive Closure ^{19,142}	Mixed	Unclear
	Open-minded thinking/ Intellectual Openness/ Curiosity ^{2,9,11,19,35,39,43,49,116,118,138,139,143–145}	Positive	Clear
Social	Empathic Concern ^{110,146}	Positive	Clear
	Emotional Diversity ^{50,120}	Positive	Clear
	Forgiveness of others ^{40,49,50,112}	Positive	Clear
	General Humility ^{18,19,138}	Positive	Clear
	Perspective Taking ^{34,49,50,110,111,120,146}	Positive	Clear
	Political Orientation ^{9,19,22}	Unrelated	Somewhat clear
	Positive perception of person/disagreement ^{22,37,42,102,103,105,112,138,147}	Positive	Clear
	Prosociality ^{2,40,110,117}	Positive	Clear
	Seeking Compromise ^{49,50,111,120}	Positive	Clear
	Social Desirability ^{2,19,35,39,49,110,138}	Positive	Somewhat clear
Personality	Agreeableness ^{9,18,19,22,35,40,126,139,146}	Positive	Clear
•	Conscientiousness ^{19,22,35,40}	Positive	Somewhat
	E 4 22 35 49 139	רי הע געניי	clear
	Extraversion ^{22,35,49,139}	Positive	Somewhat clear
	Neuroticism ^{35,40,49,139,148}	Negative	Clear
	Openness to experience ^{9,18,19,22,35,40,43,49,105,138,139}	Positive	Clear

Table 2. Correlates of Intellectual Humility

Note. Only variables with two or more manuscripts examining them are included (39 manuscripts in total are included). For Clarity of Evidence, "Clear" signifies that the direction of the association of the variable is consistent across manuscripts. "Somewhat clear" signifies that at least one manuscript reports a finding inconsistent with the other manuscripts. "Unclear" signifies that there is no consistency in results reported across manuscripts.

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